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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THERALD N. JENSEN, Executor of the) 
Estate of CLARENCE ANDERSON, De-
ceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
HENRY 0. ANDERSON and DOROTHY \ 
ANDERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
VS. 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, 
Intervenor-Respondent 
Case No. 
11367 
BRIEF OF INTERVENOR AND RESPONDENT, 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an Option 
to Purchase. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court and an advisory jury. 
From a verdict and judgment for the Intervenor, the Plain-
tiffs and Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent submits that the decision and judgment 
of the court below should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Intervenor agrees generally with the Statement of Facts 
set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff and Defendants except in the 
following particulars: 
(a) The Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim 
to Plaintiff's Complaint asserted an undivided one-half in-
tPre8t in all of the property, real and personal, described in 
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Plaintiff's Complaint (R-14) ; 
(b) The "Option to Purchase", Plaintiff's (Intervenor's) 
Exhibit 1, was admitted into evidence without objection 
(TR-21) ; 
(c) Six 0f the eight jurors answered the Interrogatory 
submitted to them in the affirmative (R-116) (R-Minute 
Entries, Page 5), which was the only genuine issue of fact 
raised. 
( d) The monetary value of Defendants' interest in the 
property described in Plaintiff's Complaint was fixed by the 
court below pursuant to the written Stipulation between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants (R-117) (R-Minute Entries, 
page 5). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Respondent will follow the general order of the points 
specified in Appellants' Brief and shall endeavor to cover 
each such point in the order enumerated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE IS NOT INDEFINITE 
OR UNCERTAIN AND DOES NOT RESERVE TO THE 
OPTIONEE ANY OBJECTIONABLE UNLIMITED OP-
TION TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF HIS ACCEPT-
ANCE OF ITS TERMS. 
The Option given by Clarence Anderson to Intervenor 
extended to Intervenor the right to purchase "any or all" of 
Anderson's livestock and farming operation (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 1). The fact that Intervenor was given the power 
to designate the quantity of the property he might choose to 
acquire, does not make the Option indefinite or uncertain so as 
to preclude specific performance. Once the Option is exer-
cised and the designation of property made by the Optionee, 
the off er and acceptance are complete and an agreement, 
specifically enforceable against either party, arises. The only 
uncertainty involved is whether or not the optionee will 
choose to exercise his option. To this extent every option, no 
matter how framed, is indefinite and uncertain. As pointed 
out in Williston on Contracts, Volume I, 3rd Edition, Section 
W, page H7: 
"The place of performance, the quantity of goods, or 
lands to be sold or bought, the kinds of goods, or the 
method of shipment may be left optional to the prom-
issee". 
The principle is stated in 46 Am. Jur., page 250: 
"An offer to sell expressly leaving the determination 
of the amount of the commodity to the Buyer gives 
rise to a binding agreement upon an acceptance by 
the Buyer designating the amount". 
And again at 46 Am. Jur .. , page 250: 
"The off eror may be bound by an offer to sell which 
allows the off eree to determine the quantity which 
he will accept . . . . mere uncertainty of the quantity 
involved does not prevent the arising of an obligation." 
An off er may contain a choice of terms submitted to 
the offeree from which he is to make a selection in his ac-
ceptance. Such an off er is necessarily indefinite, but, if 
accepted in a way contemplated, the ultimate agreement of 
the parties is made definite by acceptance. (Williston on 
Contracts, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, page 109) 
Reference is made to the case of De Remer vs. Anderson 
(H Nevada 287; 169 P. 737) where Anderson claimed an 
option to purchase "all or any part of the land leased". An-
den1on designated a tract containing 5.21 acres out of a 
larger tract and the Nevada court while holding the option 
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unenforceable did so because the evidence did not show which 
party was to make the partial designation, saying: 
"The rule, as asserted by some commentators and 
courts, that a contract giving one of the parties the 
right of selection of the lot or lots to be conveyed is 
not incapable of specific performance, would be ap-
plicable here, if the conditions of the contract or the 
facts presented were in keeping with the rule. In the 
matter at bar the absence of designation in the con-
tract as to who was to make the selection constitutes 
an element which removes this case from the rule. 
Further, had appellant, in view of the terms of the 
lease, sought to purchase all of the tract of land, the 
expression "all or any part", as set forth in this lease 
might have been a sufficient description." 
In this case Intervenor was given the option to designate 
the property to be purchased (Pl's Exhibit 1) and he exer-
cised the option by designating "all" of the property owned 
by Anderson. (R-10) 
This court in the case Calder vs. Third Judicial District 
Court (2 Utah 2d. 30.9; 273 P. 2d 168; 46 ALR 2d. 887) ruled 
that a contract for the purchase of land, a part of which was 
to be selected by the purchaser from a larger tract was valid 
and specifically enforceable. (Cited favorably in Marcinak 
vs. West Indies Investment Co. 2.9.9 F. 2rl. 821). In so deciding, 
this court distinguished the case of Reed vs. Lowe (8 Utah 3.9; 
29 P. 7 40) which case Reemed to take a contrary view by 
noting that in the Lowe case, (as in De Remer vs. Anderson, 
supra) the uncertainty really arose because the parties had 
not agreed which one of them was to make the selection of 
property. (See also Delaney vs. Shellabarger (Nev.), 353 P. 
2d. 903). (Fleishman vs. Woods (Cal.) 67 P. 276, where a 
selection of part of a tract to be made by the seller was held 
to be specifically enforceable by the purchaser). 
Since the Intervenor chose to exercise his option by 
seeking to purchase "all" of the property owned by the de-
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cedent there is no problem in specifically identifying the 
property to be acquired. The property is readily identified 
from Carbon County records, tax records, the Inventory filed 
in the Estate of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, from the Option 
itself, and from the Complaint of Plaintiff and Answer of the 
Defendants. As stated by this court in Cummings vs. Nielson 
(42 Utah 157; 129 P. 619) and followed in Johnson vs. Jones 
(109 Utah 92; 16/, P. 2d. 893); and Nielsen vs. Rucker (8 Utah 
2d. 302; 333 P. 1067): 
"It is elementary that in equity that is certain which can 
be made certain. In case certain lands are mentioned by name 
merely in a contract, without giving a definite description, 
the lands intended in the contract may always be shown by 
extrinsic, parol or documentary evidence." 
There is no uncertainty or indefiniteness as to the property 
covered by the Option so as to preclude its specific perform-
ance. 
Appellants contend the Option is so uncertain as to terms 
of payment as to make it unenforceable. A reading of the 
Option (Pl's Ex. 1) shows that the purchase price is readily 
ascertainable; the down payment is specified ( % of purchase 
price) ; the interest rate is specified ( 5 % ) ; and the ultimate 
time for final payment is stated (on or before 17 years from 
date of sale). 
Reference is made to the case of Thomas vs. Johnson 
(55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437) where it was claimed that the option 
involved was too vague and uncertain to be enforceable. The 
terms of payment were as follows: "% cash, % on or before 
December 15, 1917, balance 10 years time at 8% per annum". 
This court held that such terms were sufficiently definite and 
Rubject to specific enforcement. 
This case now before the court is no less certain and the 
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performance required of Intervenor is sufficiently stated. 
In the Thomas vs. Johnson case supra, it was claimed to 
the Supreme Court that the security afforded the seller was 
inadequate and indefinite just as Appellants now suggest in 
their Brief. However, the question of adequacy of security 
was never raised by Appellants below and as this court said 
in the Thomas case, (supm): 
"If the security contemplated was so ii1'.ldequate as to 
render the transaction inequitable and unenforceable, 
it was incumbent upon the seller to establish the fart 
to the satisfaction of the court. Inadequacy of securitv 
is not made an issue in the pleadings; the evidenc~ 
offered by Seller does not disclose it." Fitzgemld v~. 
Boyle (.57 Utah 234; 193 P. 1109) 
The situation is similar in the case now before the court. 
Inadequacy of security has not been made an issue. Further, 
the matter is now largely moot, since the Plaintiff has sold 
all of the sheep and a substantial amount of the other personal 
property covered by the Option in the Probate proceeding. 
(R-127-128) 
Appellants question the action of the court below in 
"making certain" the payment of interest by requiring Inter-
venor to pay the same at least annually. In Thomas vs. John-
son, supra,. this court held that fixing an annual interest rate 
alone was sufficiently definite so that the action of the court 
below perhaps was favorable to Appellants in that there 
would appear to be no reason why Anderson could not agree to 
a contract where neither principal or interest should come due 
until the end of the term. 
In respect to the ruling by the court below that legal title 
to the property covered by the Option should all remain in the 
heirs of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, until paid for, this 
would seem to be what was reasonably contemplated by the 
parties and although the Option if uncertain should be con-
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strued most strongly against the Intervenor, since he prepared 
it, which principle was subscribed to by this court in Maw vs. 
Noble (10 Utah 2d. 440; 354 P. 2d. 121) cited by Appellants, 
the court further said : 
"But this rule applies only where there is some genuine 
lack of certainty, and not to strained or merely fanciful 
or wishful interpretations that may be indulged in. 
A contract must be looked at realistically in the light 
of the circumstances under which it was entered into, 
and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained 
with reasonable certainty it must be given effect." 
See Bunnel vs. Bills (13 Utah 2d. 83; 368 P. 2d .. 597) 
The law does not favor, but leans against, the destruction 
of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, 
so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable 
intentions of the parties if that can be ascertained. Mclllmoil 
vs. Frawley Motor Co. (Cal) 213 P. 971; Hunter vs. Sparling 
(Cal) 197 p. 2d. 807. 
Appellants cite the case of Pitcher vs. Lauritzen (18 Utah 
2d. 368; 423 P .. 2d. 491) as compelling a conclusion that the 
Option in this case is too uncertain to be specifically enforced. 
Intervenor disagrees. While the court in Pitcher apparently 
did not consider Thomas vs. Johnson (supra). its conclusions 
reached in Pitcher would in no way reverse the position taken 
in Thomas. In Pitcher the case was actually disposed of by a 
finding of mutual abandonment, but the court went on to 
say that irrespective of abandonment the earnest money re-
ceipt involved was so uncertain as to be unenforceable. While 
it stated that the balance was to be carried by seller under 
a contract "or" a second mortgage, there was nothing pro-
vided to show who should make that election, nor was the 
length of the term stated over which payments were to be 
made. Pitcher is not good authority to compel a finding of 
uncertainty in the case now before the court. 
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Likewise the case of Candland vs. Oldroyd (67 Utah 605; 
248 P. 1101) cited by Appellants does not present facts anal-
ogous to the case at hand. In Candland an off er was made in 
the alternative. The reply merely stated "your proposition is 
accepted." The court held there was never such meeting of the 
minds as would give rise to a binding contract. 
In the case now before the court there is no uncertainty 
in the Option to Purchase as to how long the Intervenor might 
take to pay the purchase price; the instrument specifically 
states that "the balance to be paid in 17 years from the date 
of sale or sooner." 
It is curious to note that while Appellants assail the 
language in the Option to Purchase "an option to purchase 
from me or my heirs any or all of the property I own" (PJ's 
Ex. 1) as calling for an objectionable, unlimited election, the 
plaintiff himself in his capacity as attorney for Clarence 
Anderson prepared an had executed a Last Will and Testament 
whereby Clarence Anderson extended to Plaintiff's son a 
right to acquire from the estate after his death the real prop-
erty Clarence Anderson may have owned at the time of his 
death, using the following language: 
"I grant to James T. Jensen the right to purchase any 
part of my real estate at the inventory and appraise-
ment value." (PJ's Exh. #9; TR 195; TR 224) 
Thereafter the Plaintiff, in his capacity as Executor of 
the Estate of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, petitioned the 
court in the Probate proceeding for authority to convey the 
same real property claimed by Intervenor under the exercise 
of his Option to Purchase, to the said James T. Jensen pur-
suant to a so-called "election" under said Will. (Probate 
File #3159, pages 30-36) 
If the language used by Plaintiff in the Anderson Will 
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was certain and clear enough to support a petition to the 
Probate court, it would seem that similar language used in the 
Option to Purchase (Pl's Exh. #1) would be equally certain 
an<l understandable even though drafted by Intervenor, a 
person with no legal background or training. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE OPTION 
TO PURCHASE. 
An option is an offer, which if given without considera-
tion may be withdrawn by the optioner at any time prior to 
acceptance (55 Am. Jur. 502). However, if acceptance is 
given prior to withdrawal, a binding contract is formed ir-
respective of whether or not there was any consideration for 
the option itself (55 Am. Jur. 503). 
If consideration is given for the option, it may not be 
withdrawn except within the terms expressed in the option 
itself. The consideration for the option is a thing apart from 
the consideration for the sale ( 55 Am. J ur. 502). 
The court below expressed himself as so believing the 
law to be. (TR, 7) 
The court below found that Intervenor exercised the 
Option before it was withdrawn (Finding of Fact No. 10, R 
125), but regardless of that Finding there was consideration 
for the Option, as also found by the court below (Finding of 
Fact No. 9, R 125). 
The Option itself recites that Intervenor performed many 
services for Clarence Anderson for which he was not paid, 
(Pl's Exh. #1) and the testimony of the several witnesses 
confirms the allegation. 
The witness Valentine testified that Intervenor performed 
work for Anderson at the farm and on the Schofield property 
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(TR 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28) ; the witness Marchello likewise 
so testified (TR 45, 46, 47, 48) (worked on sheds twenty or 
twenty-five different times) ;the witness Nielson so testified 
(TR 66, 68) ; and the witness Allred so testified (TR 71, 72). 
There is no evidence to the contrary. 
The real question concerning these services performed 
by Intervenor is not whether they were done "at no cost" to 
Anderson but whether they were performed as a gratuity or 
whether they were performed with the expectation that they 
would be paid for in some way. 
If the services were performed as a gratuity or gift with 
no expectation or obligation of payment, then such services 
could be characterized as "past consideration" and under the 
rule set out in the authorities cited by Appellants, be insuf. 
ficient as a legal consideration to support the Option to 
Purchase. 
However, the court below found and concluded that the 
parties, as evidenced by the wording of the Option itself and 
the nature and extent of the services performed, did contem-
plate that such services were not merely gratuitous but were 
to be paid for at least in part by Anderson giving said Option 
to Intervenor, and that the words "at no cost to me" used in 
the Option were not an expression of gratuity, but were rather 
a statement of fact that such services had not theretofore been 
paid for. (R 125, 128) 
The undisputed facts of this case show that Intervenor 
performed substantial services for the deceased, as testified 
to by the various witnesses already ref erred to; that there 
was no relationship between Intervenor and the deceased to 
indicate that such services were furnished or should have been 
furnished as a gratuity on the part of Intervenor; that no 
circumstances existed which would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude such services were furnished merely as a gift; that 
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the deceased clearly benefited from such services and knew 
of their performance by Intervenor; and that, as recited in the 
Option, no payment for such services had been made. Under 
these conditions the court could reasonably find an implied 
request for such services by Anderson and his implied promise 
to p::i,y for the same. (Thomasic vs. Thom1sic 198 Atlantic 
2d . .511; In re Stewart's Will, 100 New York Supplement 2d. 
:J.'Jt,, 199 M?:sc. 1104, 108 New York Supplement 2nd 969, 279 
A.jl?Jcllate Division 628; 17 Am. Jur .. 2d. 337; Restatement of 
Contracts, Volume 1 Sec. 5; Gleason vs. Salt Lake City 7 4 P. 
2rl. 1225; Mccollum vs. Clothier 241 P. 2d. 468). Intervenor 
could not testify to these matters directly because of the Dead 
Man Statute (78-24-2 Utah Code Annatated 1953, as amended) 
invoked by Appellants (TR 86) but the circumstances of the 
relationship and the nature of the benefit conferred reason-
ably compel the conclusion that good and sufficient considera-
tion existed for said Option. Appellants have pointed to 
nothing in the record, nor indeed can they do so, which could 
reasonably compel any other conclusion. 
The case of Manwill vs. Oyler (11 Utah 2d. 433; 361 P. 
2d. 177) cited by Appellants does not in fact support their 
position in this case. In Manwill the claimed oral promise to 
pay was barred by the Statute of Limitations and the court 
held that the bare moral obligation thereupon arising was not 
valid consideration for the claimed subsequent promise. No 
such situation exists in this case, but rather the circumstances 
here reasonably permit the conclusion that Intervenor ex-
pected to be paid for his services and that Anderson expected 
to pay him. M:irnon vs. Vaughan Motor Co. (Ore) 194 P. 2d. 
9.92: Irons Investment vs. Richardson (Wash) 50 P. 2d. 42) 
The court below having found all these matters in favor 
of Intervenor, and there being substantial evidence in the 
record to support such action, the judgment of the court below 
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should not be disturbed on appeal unless all reasonable minds 
would believe contrary to the finding of the court below. No 
such conclusion is warranted in this case. 
(Hank vs. Hales 17 Utah, 2d 344, 411P .. 2d. 836; Child vs. 
Child 8 Utah 2d 261, 3."-12 P. 2d. 981; McCollum vs. Clothier 
241 P. 2d. 468) 
Appellants, at page 7 of their Brief, allude to an opinion 
by Calvin Rampton, attorney, concerning said Option and 
infer that he told Intervenor said Option was not legal. The 
full record will show that such was not the opinion of that 
attorney (published Deposition of Intervenor, page 15, lines 
1-12), and in any event such opinion should have no more 
bearing upon the issues before this court than that of any 
attorney not before the court as an expert or in any other 
capacity. 
POINT III 
THE JURY COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN 
PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY BY COMMENTS MADE IN 
THEIR PRESENCE BY THE COURT BELOW. 
Appellants contend the following observations and state-
ments made by the court below in the presence of the Jury 
were most prejudicial to Appelalnts' position: 
(a) The court: "Well, I won't express my own opinion 
concerning it at this time as to experts" (TR, 
page 202, lines 3 and 4) ; 
(b) The court: "Let's don't take all day to do it then" 
(TR 161, page 19 and 20); 
( c) The court: "Clarence Anderson? Tell me that? 
How in the heavens could you have a Jury believe 
that he can reproduce the signature of one now 
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deceased, who rarely wrote his signature?" (TR 
161, line 1-3) 
( d) The court: "All we know is we've got some signa-
tures here which purport to be, which now purport 
to be the signature of Clarence Anderson, other 
instruments that purport to bear his signature, 
let's get down to the thing and find whether they 
are or not (TR 161, lines 13-16) ; 
( e) The court: "I may use that word of the signature, 
that appears on said exhibits .... " (TR 1667, lines 
9-10); 
(f) The court: " .... does subordinate the claimant to 
some interest he has and doubtless he signed it." 
"He (Garcia, Appellants Expert Witness) can tell 
us whether it's a genuine signature, as an expert 
in this field, or whether it's not his signature" 
(TR 197, lines 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13) ; 
(g) The court: "It's a public record and purports to 
be the signature and it is received in evidence." 
(TR 200, lines 4-5) ; 
(h) Extended comments of the court set out at pages 
202 and 203 of Transcript of Proceedings. 
( i) The court: "You can't get someone to sign for 
you, I am sure of that. No, I think they are legiti-
mate instruments and I think they may be genuine, 
but whether they are genuine for sure, I don't 
know, but I think he has a right to say, Is that his 
signature in your opinion. I think an expert must 
contemplate that, that he is going to be asked 
concerning that, similarities of one signature 
purporting to be that of a man in question as 
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against other signaturess. How else could you 
cross-examine the witness?" (TR 205, lines 8-16) 
(The court ruling on admission of Exhibit 12) ; 
(j) The court: "What objection do you have Don't 
you want that Jury to examine and determine 
whether or not for example the signatures on the 
Will correspond or differ from-wouldn't you want 
that. I won't insist upon it and if you feel it is 
unfair, but I don't think it is." (TR 299, lines 3-8). 
While the court in the trial of the case should not express 
his opinion as to what facts the evidence may or may not show, 
the court certainly has some right, and duty, to inquire of 
counsel concerning mattres which the court may reasonably 
feel will bring the true state of the facts involved to the at-
tention of the Jury. 
The observations now objected to, which were not them-
selves rulings or orders of the court and to which no exceptions 
were taken during the trial, were made by the court in con-
nection with rulings concerning the admissability of docu-
ments purporting to bear the signature of Anderson, the 
genuineness of whose signature on the Option to Purchase 
was questioned, for the purposes of comparison by Appellants' 
expert witness. The court did not state or inf er his opinion 
as the facts to be ultimately determined by the Jury. There 
is no showing that any substantial rights of the Appellants 
were affected by the court in its conduct of the trial. (Rules 
51 and 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Federated Milk 
Producers Association vs. Statewide Plumbing and Heating 
Co. 11 Utah 2d 2.95, 358 P. 2d. 348; Douglas vs. Duvall 5 Utah 
2d 429; 304 P. 2d. 373; Fox vs. Taylor 10 Utah 2d 17 4; 350 
P. 2d 154). 
In any event the court fully instructed the Jury at the 
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close of the case to the effect that the Jury should not consider 
anything the court might have said or done during the course 
of the trial as indicating in any way any feelings or opinions 
in the matter and clearly informed them that they were the 
exclusive judges of the facts. (Inst. No. 4, R 108) 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
The basic document involved in this law suit is the Option 
to Purchase (PJ's Exh. #1). Its execution by Anderson was 
testified to by two witnesses, Valentine and Marchello (TR 
20, 49 and 50) and the Exhibit was admitted into evidence 
without objection (TR 21). It was thus endowed with a 
presumption of validity. The language of the questioned 
instruction (R 111) concerning the degree of proof necessary 
to overcome such presumption is taken tlmost verbatim from 
the case Hanks vs. Hales 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P. 2d 836,. de-
cided by this court in 1966. That "clear and convincing evi-
dence" means a higher degree of proof than a mere "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" was stated by this court in the 
case of Jimenez vs. O'Brien, 117 Utah 82, 213 P. 2d 337. The 
instruction given was in accordance with law. 
The burden of proof respecting the overall case was given 
to the Jury in Instruction No. 16 (R115) and when the in-
structions are read in conjunction with each other it would 
appear that Appellants' position in the case was more favor-
ably stated than it should have been. Appellants did not in 
any event request of the court an instruction of their own to 
hetter explain the matter to the Jury. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
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TO GIVE APPELLANTS REQUESTED INTERROGATORY 
NO. 2 TO THE JURY. 
Appellants have contended that Clarence Anderson was 
illiterate and therefore did not understand the contents of the 
Option he gave to Intervenor. They quoted to the court below 
a definition of illiterate as being one: 
"Unacquainted with letters, unlettered, ignorate of 
letters or books, untaught, uninstructed in science. It 
does not necessarily imply an inability to sign one's 
name." (TR May 20, 1969, page 55) 
Appellants offered no credible evidence whatever to sup-
port the claim that Anderson did not understand the terms of 
the Option. The fact that a man may not be able to read or 
count does not raise any inference that he is not capable of 
understanding (TR 314-317). In this case the evidence and 
inferences all point to the fact that Anderson did know what 
he was doing. Intervenor read the Option out loud to Anderson 
and Anderson said it was okay (TR 19, 20, 31, 32, 49, 50, 54); 
Anderson had talked with Intervenor two or three weeks 
before the Option was signed about land and sheep prices 
(TR 51) ; Anderson purchased considerable building materials 
(TR 65) for which he wrote checks in payment (TR 66, 67); 
Anderson signed his name to pay checks (TR 76) and later 
signed a Last Will and Testament with similar option pro-
visions (Pl's Exh. #9) which was admitted to Probate as the 
act of a man "of sound and disposing mind" (R Probate File 
#3159, pages 15 and 16) ; and accumulated an estate con-
sisting of two checking accounts, one savings account, con-
siderable machinery and equipment, over 1,000 head of live-
stock, several thousand acres of land with water rights and 
grazing permits, all valued at the time of his death in ex-
cess of $120,000 (R Probate File #3159, pages 27, 28, 29). 
There is no credible evidence to support the request of Appel-
lants to submit an issue of Anderson's possible lack of under-
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standing to the Jury and the court below properly withheld 
the same from the Jury, the court not being compelled in the 
absence of such credible evidence to draw inferences favorable 
to Appellants since all the credible evidence and inferences 
therefrom pointed the other way. (Winegar vs .. Slim Olson 
Inc. 252 P. 2d 205; Gregory vs. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad 
Cu., 8 Utah 2d 114; 329 P. 2d 407). 
POINT VI 
THE LANDS AWARDED TO INTERVENOR BY THE 
COURT BELOW WERE ALL EMBRACED WITHIN THE 
OPTION TO PURCHASE. 
The Option to Purchase gives Intervenor the right to 
purchase "all of the property I own" and then says "consisting 
of" describing generally land, sheep, buildings, machinery, 
water rights, and hay. (Pl's Exh. #1). While generally agree-
ments are constructed most strongly against those who prepare 
them and where general and specific terms are used in the 
same instrument, the specific provisions qualify the general 
provision, the apparent purpose of the parties is given great 
weight in determining the meaning to be given to manifesta-
tions of intention or to any part thereof (Restatement of Con-
tracts, Section 236). A consideration of the entire Option 
document makes it rather clear that the parties were dealing 
with Anderson's entire livestock and farming operation. 
Appellants particularly object to the inclusion of 160 
acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 12 
South, Range 7 East, SLB&M because it is alleged that title 
Henry 0. Anderson. There is no evidence in the record to sup-
to this land was in the joint names of Clarence Anderson and 
port such assertion. On the contrary this particular property 
is listed in the Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Henry 
0. Anderson to quiet title (R 3) ; it is listed in the Probate 
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Inventory and Appraisement in the Clarence Anderson Estate 
(Probate File # 3159, page 28) ; it is listed by inference in 
Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories where Plaintiff des. 
cribes the mountain land as consisting of 3760 acres, the same 
number of acres as listed in the court's Decree (R 53, 126); 
it is listed in the property sought to be acquired by James 
T. Jensen under the Option stated in the Last Will and Testa. 
ment of Clarence Anderson, Deceased (R Probate File #3159, 
page 32) and by the terms of the Stipulation entered into be-
tween Plaintiff and Defendants, the right of the estate to the 
property was recognized in consideration of the payment of 
$8,000.00 to Defendants in satisfaction of all of their claims 
(R 117, 118). It is obvious that the 160 acres is part of 
Clarence Anderson's property and is covered by the Option. 
As regards the Miller Creek property referred to in the 
Option, it is specifically referred to as "around 200 acres." 
The actual acreage shown in Plaintiff's Complaint, the In-
ventory and the Petition by James T. Jensen, as well as the 
Decree, all above referred to, and lying in Sections 16 and 21, 
Township 15 South, Range 10 East, SLB&M, show a total 
of 240 acres; well within a reasonable interpretation of even 
the specific wording of the Option. 
As regards the 640 acres referred to in Appellants' Brief 
as being located in Section 2, Township 15 South, Range 9 
East, SLB&M, there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
concerning whether or not it is farm land, its location to 
canals or when it was acquired by Clarence Anderson. The 
record does show however that it is listed in Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, the Petition of 
James T. Jensen and the Inventory and Appraisement, all 
above ref erred to. The character of this land is further ex-
plained and its relationship to the Clarence Anderson opera-
tion is shown by the facts that in Plaintiff's Answers to 
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[nterrogatories (R 52) this land is listed in conjunction with 
what is referred to as the Miller Creek property, all having 
a value of $20,000.00, and in the Inventory and Appraisement 
filed in the Clarence Anderson Estate it is listed in conjunction 
with the same Miller Creek property and for which an aggre-
gate value for all such valley land is fixed in the amount of 
$20,390.00 (R Probate File No. 3159, page 29). 
Appellants obviously consider this 640 acres to be part 
of the farm and livestock operation owned by Clarence Ander-
son and it is submitted that the same reasonably falls within 
the terms of the Option held by Intervenor, and for which he 
is by the courts Decree committed to pay the Option price 
of $21,000.00 (Pl's Exh. #1, R 127, 133). 
POINT VII 
THE OPTION GIVEN INTERVENOR IS EFFECTIVE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT HENRY ANDERSON AND 
ANY PARTNERSHIP THAT MAY HAVE EXISTED BE-
TWEEN HIM AND CLARENCE ANDERSON, NOW DE-
CEASED. 
Intervenor submits that all of the argument and author-
ities cited by Appellants in their Brief under their Point VII 
are inapplicable and moot. The Appellants between them-
selves by Stipulation filed in this case (R 117-119) and 
adopted by the court below (R 124, 128, 132, 133) have settled 
the position of Defendants Anderson in respect to any claims 
they may have in the matter. They specifically agree that 
whatever interest Defendants had in the property listed in 
Plaintiff's Complaint is limited to the sum of $8000.00 and 
that the court might enter judgment accordingly against the 
ERtate and in favor of Defendants. The Stipulation refers to 
3760 acres of mountain land which is the total amount claimed 
to have been held either as partnership property or as the 
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sole property of Clarence Anderson. Since Defendants have 
settled their claim against the property for $8000.00 they have 
no further interest in specific property and it can be of no 
possible concern to Defendants what Clarence Anderson 
agreed to do with the property. 
It appears to be the position of Appellants (TR May 20, 
1968, pages 4-46) that although as between themselves they 
have fixed the full value of Defendant's interest in the entire 
property involved in this law suit at $8000.00, and if Inter-
venor were not involved, Plaintiff could get a release from 
Defendants of any and all claims in the specific property 
upon payment of $8000.00, the fact that Intervenor is involved 
to the extent that the court has ruled he is entitled to buy all 
such property, Plaintiff wants to be paid the full purchase 
price for all the property and Defendants want Intervenor 
to pay them an additional $8,000.00 for their interest, even 
though such interest is included in the full purchase price in 
favor of Plaintiffs. The effect of this reasoning is that the 
sum of the parts of a whole is greater than the whole. In 
other words 2 plus 2 equals 5. Not only is this bad arithmatic, 
but it is bad logic and no basis for a judicial decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decree and Judgment of the court below should be 
sustained. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & 
MOODY 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
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